Who is Gene Sharp?

Dr. Gene Sharp is 83 years old and was born in North Baltimore, Ohio. Sharp never married or had children and according to an article in the 2007 November/ December issue of the Ohio State University Alumni Association Newsletter the healthy octogenarian lives and works out of his Boston, MA, home. This article is unique in that it provides details about Sharp’s private life not easily found.

In certain circles (mainly consisting of leaders who are not buying into the U.S. economic scheme) Sharp is a famous guy, renowned the world over as one of the leading guru’s of nonviolent resistance, he is a prolific writer on the subject of nonviolence starting with his 1951 masters thesis titled “Nonviolence: A Sociological Study” and 1968 doctoral dissertation titled “The Politics of Nonviolent Action: A Study in the Control of Political Power” He is currently the senior scholar at the Albert Einstein Institution which according to their website Sharp founded in 1983. The AEI website goes on saying, “The Albert Einstein Institution is dedicated to advancing the study and use of strategic nonviolent action in conflicts throughout the world. It is committed to the defense of freedom, democracy, and the reduction of political violence through the use of nonviolent action.”

The Wikipedia entry for AEI says Sharp spent time in prison as a conscientious objector during the Korean War but when examining both his curriculum vita and publication’s list (available for download at the AEI website) it seems unlikely since the Korean War ran from 1950 to 1953 which is exactly the time Sharp was finishing his Master’s thesis noted above. Surely a person of such renown around issues of nonviolence would include on his CV incarceration as a conscientious objection to a war as he is quite willing to share stories about his early experiences attempting to desegregate lunch counters in Ohio. His CV also does not mention his work with A.J. Muste, which the Wikipedia entry also mentioned.

Sharp has a long history at the Center for International Affairs according to his curriculum vita downloaded from the AEI website Sharp’s first research fellow position at the Center for International Affairs ran from 1965 to 1972. In 1965 Sharp began a portion of his career at the Center for International Affairs (CIA) Harvard University where he has worked for over three decades alongside other foreign policy’s notables such as Samuel P. Huntington and other past directors for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

The following excerpt was taken from the introduction of the anti insurgent classic “Counter Insurgency Warfare – Theory and Practice” written by David Galula under the auspices of the Center for International Affairs in 1966

“Created in 1958, the Center fosters advanced study of basic world problems by scholars from various disciplines and seniors officers from many countries. The research at the Center, focusing on the processes of change, includes studies of military-political issues, the modernizing processes in developing countries, and the evolving position of Europe. The research programs are supervised by Professors Robert R. Bowie (Director of the Center), Alex Inkeles, Henry A. Kissinger, Edward S. Mason, Thomas C. Schelling and Raymond Vernon.”

Each of these men with the exception of Raymond Vernon worked in or has an official affiliated the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Robert R. Bowie was the Deputy Director of the CIA from 1977 to 1979. Thomas C. Schelling also identified as working in the CIA served for a number of years on the board of the AEI. Finding information on Sharp is a task. It’s almost like he doesn’t exist. He is practically unknown in the English language press while certain leaders around the globe are very well versed with his work.

In the aforementioned Ohio State Alumni article Sharp is called the “most famous guy you’ve never heard of” This article makes two important points about Sharps work in that they give a sense of where Sharp has gone with his research. In spite of his impressive publications list this article which is obviously pro-Sharp points out, “Friendly critics lament that Sharp has not submitted his work—a massive collection of articles, arranged by topic—to rigorous academic testing… But Sharp believes in his ideas. He thinks he has developed a whole new theory of politics.” This point is probably the most startling of all. It is also a good clue as to why Sharp has stayed out of the cross hairs of other academics mostly because his ideas seemed to have been developed implemented and debated primarily within the arena of military tactics.

The very next paragraph sheds some interesting light on what is perhaps the most important point of all in dealing with Sharp’s theory of power. It is this theory or “new understanding” as Sharp puts it that supposedly helps us to understand how non violence can be used to effect political change. The author explains Sharp’s position on power:

The theory can be stated simply: Power, even in the most closed and brutal dictatorship, depends on consent. Ordinary people can band together to withdraw their consent. Movements succeed when they refuse to resort to violence, since the regime always possesses superior instruments of violence. Ergo, the future of democracy and freedom depends on nonviolence.

His description of how society and particularly tyrants rule in society is taken directly from Gramsci’s theory of Hegemony. According to Brian Martin who provides one of the few academic analysis of Sharps work, “Sharp defines political power, which is one type of social power, as the “totality of means, influences, and pressures – including authority, rewards, and sanctions – available for use to achieve the objectives of the power-holder, especially the institutions of government, the State, and groups opposing either of them.” So obedience and belief is key to how power works in society. It is obedience to the power structure, Martin’s analysis of Sharps theory of power goes on to say about why men obey their rulers “that there is no single answer, but that important are habit, fear of sanctions, moral obligation self-interest, psychological identification with the ruler, zones of indifference and absence of self confidence among subjects.”

Throughout his career Sharp has avoided serious academic scrutiny. He has no articles published with in academic journals and rarely cites within his own work. Even in the above mentioned article by Martin (1989), which is one of the few available that specifically offers an analysis of Sharp’s theories the author writes in the opening paragraphs that his “analysis is done in the spirit of sympathetic criticism.” This friendly analysis does not, however, keep Martin from pointing out the obvious Marxist progenitors of Sharps “original” theories. Martin though does point out “It is not by chance that Sharp regularly refers to Stalinism and Nazism. His examples of challenges to authority largely concern situations which are widely perceived as oppressive by contemporary Western political judgment.”

The heart of Sharp’s argument is that power is taken. It cannot and will not be given or handed over in fact cannot be, but that only through a decisive, planned, structured and boldly implemented strategy of action people can take control of their situation and break the tyranny of dictators. Sharp’s close associate Col. Robert Helvey describes his first encounter with Sharp this way in the forward to Helvey’s book titled “On Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: Thinking about the Fundamentals” published by the AEI in 2004,

“While I was attending Harvard University as an US Army Senior Fellow at the Center for International Affairs in 1987-88, toward the end of my thirty year career as a US Army Infantry Officer, I met Dr. Sharp during a meeting of the Program for Nonviolent Sanctions. He introduced his subject with the words: “Strategic nonviolent struggle is about seizing political power or denying it to others. It is not about pacifism, moral or religious beliefs.”

The premise of Sharp’s work the taking of political power and the promotion of nonviolence as the main strategy of struggle are for the AEI clearly not based on a morality of nonviolence. This is an interesting position since it is quite clear that the AEI uses the image of Gandhi and other leaders of nonviolent movements in the 20th century to front the organization’s ideological image.

Sharp is a reformist, a liberalist who seeks to up hold the rule of law by conducting change within a society as lawfully as possible. The mission statement of the AEI makes this clear when it states a part of the mission is to “defend democratic freedoms and institutions,” and ever increasingly curious position for those who claims to be against state repression. With the constant enmeshing of capitalism and democracy the economic oppression of much of the worlds population and the use of Law/Force/Violence to uphold those “democratic freedoms and institutions” as if they can only be granted this way, is another chink the armor of non violence theory propagated by Sharp and others.

For purposes of this discussion we will look at the most widely translated and distributed piece produced by the AEI, “From Dictatorship To Democracy – A Conceptual Framework of Liberation.” During this examination a consideration of the organizing methodology and discussion of power in terms of the ability of organized and motivated elements of civil society within a given country to face and overthrow a dictatorship without the use of violence or military force.

This booklet contains some very good general advice for organizing a revolution or coup. Sharp is clear that the advice is purposely general. He starts from a very simple premise. Dictatorships are bad. People should overthrow them and replace them with democracies, because democracy is good for business. However, while there may be a general agreement that dictatorships are bad, even though it must be pointed out that Sharp does not go into great detail about how to identify a dictatorship. Ideological agreements about the nature of may be a little harder to come by. Sharp also seems very careful to limit his criticism and identifications of dictators to communists and his criticisms of colonialism especially colonial powers are as non-existent as his class analysis. It is little wonder Gene Sharp is more famous in the 30 other languages than English.

His most widely discussed book was not written to be scrutinized academically. It is an organizing manual with cold hard advice about the mobilization of the masses in any given society. The author’s claim as to how he arrived at his conclusions is questionable but the advice on how to arrive at his stated goals appears sound. So the crux of any criticism levied at Sharp and his work cannot necessarily be about the organizing methodology. Questions for him should center on the misrepresentation of this theories as original to himself and this colleagues.

In analyzing Sharp’s booklet, first published in “Bangkok in 1993 by the Committee for the Restoration of Democracy in Burma in association with Khit Pyaing (The New Era Journal)” that is considered by most to be and eighty eight page distillation of his most important work the conclusion anyone must come to is that by his own words he has discovered new theories of power centering on obedience and consent. Sharp uses the rhetoric of revolution to contextualize reform and in doing this he doesn’t really break any new ground with practical organizational advice but he does raise some provocative and troubling questions by challenging without any supporting documentation the historically documented success of armed struggle in overthrowing dictatorships since World War II. His theories of obedience appear straight out of Marxist theory; particularly that of Antonio Gramsci and his theories of power echo Foucault profoundly. Finally, even the organization of his revolutionary structure, his magnum opus submitted to millions across the globe is based deeply on Maoist methods and theories of guerilla warfare and insurgency.

Careful consideration of these claims shows how difficult it is almost impossible to talk about social change or revolution without contextualizing it within a Marxist vocabulary. Why is this and what problems does it present for Sharp? Saul Alinsky in his seminal work “Rules for Radicals” lays out the ideological problem within the opening chapter, “The have-nots of the world, swept up in their present upheavals and desperately seeking revolutionary writings can find such literature only from the communists, both red and yellow. Here they can read about tactics, maneuvers, strategy and principles of action in the making of revolution.” Alinsky is pointed about the fact communism and communist theory was seen at the time as “synonymous with revolution”

The footnote below from Alinsky’s introduction is also important both to the work of Alinsky and Sharp as it help us to understand the anti communist milieu where these two made their careers. Certainly any contemporary of Alinsky whom time has shown shares some similar passions in the field of organizing mass movements would be at the very least familiar with this book. The footnote is a quote from U.S. Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas written for the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions Occasional Paper No. 116, and it sets for us and ideological stage of mental competition not so subtly present in the theoretical aspirations of Sharp. O’ Douglas writes:

On trips to Asia I often asked men in there thirties and forties what they were reading when they were eighteen. They usually answered ‘Karl Marx’; and when I asked them why, they replied, ‘we were under colonial rule, seeking a way out. We wanted our independence. To get it we had to make revolution. The only books on revolution were published by the communists.’ These men almost invariable had repudiated communism as a political cult, retaining, however, a tinge of socialism. As I talked with them, I came to realize the great opportunities we missed when we became preoccupied in fighting communism with bombs and with dollars, rather than with ideas of revolution, of freedom, of justice.

While it is impossible to say for sure that Sharp read Alinsky’s book it is safe to say the likelihood is high. Capitalism may have triumphed in the minds of some but it is apparent that for many decades Communism as a critique of capitalism was the refuge of the oppressed. A stronghold of theory for the emancipation of humankind from economic slavery, how should that understanding impact our view of Gene Sharp and the Albert Einstein Institution? Sharp is a theoretical ventriloquist. The dummy he uses to misdirect his audience with is his program of nonviolence that under certain desperate circumstances looks like revolution and with some help can talk, but will never walk on its own. It moves with the fingers and hand of Capitalist interest on the levers in its back. This is the curse of democracy, being to closely associate with capitalism until they have become in the minds of many synonymous.

The reality of Sharp’s booklet when put into the cold hard light of the day is that dictatorships and democracies will have not have moral dilemmas, problems about eliminating the opposition (Chile and Guatemala are both excellent examples of the widespread use of violent repression by U.S. backed “democracy” movements). It would perhaps be interesting to see how Sharp’s ideas about nonviolence could be applied to enact revolutionary change within the United States by and organized Xicano Movement.

How can the organizational and “political defiance” theories of Sharp and his military advisor Col. Robert Helvey broadcast by the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) throughout the Second and Third World, and through its funding of the Albert Einstein Institution impact freedom struggles with the borders of this country or throughout the America’s. Their attempted misdirection of nonviolent direct action away from the moral underpinnings of Tolstoy, Gandhi, King and Chavez have, within their Cold War paradigm of anti communism/pro capitalism, attempted to remove the question of power, democracy and capitalism from the crucible of revolutionary struggle and in fact maybe attempting to redefine and question the very basis of force (Gewalt) in revolutionary theory and its legitimate application to oppression.

Political Defiance then, in Sharp’s estimation, can only be effective as counter balance to what he calls the “centralizing effects of violent sanctions” He goes on here and through out the booklet boldly equating nonviolence with democracy by saying, “the use of the technique of nonviolent struggle contributes to democratizing the political society in several ways.” The equation of nonviolence with democracy or democratic movements is a particularly troubling move on Sharp’s part, because if nonviolence equals democracy then violence must equal communism or dictatorship, which in Sharp’s lexicon are the same thing.

Understandable considering his age, association and intellectual collaboration with some of the worlds foremost anti communist thinkers at the Center for International Affairs. Troubling though since Sharp attempts to equate democracy with peace when in fact the violence of Marxism has been a reaction against both capitalist and democratic aggressions on economic and military fronts. It is important to keep in mind Marxism as a theory is first and foremost a critique of and reaction to capitalism as an economic system, it stands to reason then any real world actions taken on the part of Marxists are expansions of that critique.

Taking these points into account it would seem a legitimate question for all to consider is the future of revolution. There is more at stake in this discussion than simply whether or not nonviolence is more effective than violence as a political solution to despotism, as if despotism could be universally defined. The real stake in this affair is the Marxist heritage of revolution. How will future generations understand change, revolution and communism? Who will be the interpreters of that legacy and its present day manifestations? As a function of Capitalist democracy limited to reform agreements between oppressed workers and industrialists or as an authentic discourse creating the vocabulary and the practices surrounding it can lay legitimate claim to real change. Since Sharp has chosen to couch his theories in the theories of Marxist liberationists it is equally important to examine his organizing methodology for similar roots.

To help frame the discussion around Sharp’s methodological recommendations we must first look at his claims of originality   in regards to his theory of action. Since it is clear that contrary to his contentions these are not new theories of power but in fact draws deeply from Marxist theory in determining not just how revolution should take place but how we as “democrats” should think and talk about it. To do this it is important to understand the foundation of change inherent in Marxist thought. Mao Tse-Tung writes,

Marxist philosophy holds that the most important problem does not lie in understanding the laws of the objective world and this being able to explain it, but in applying the knowledge of these laws actively to change the world. From the Marxist viewpoint, theory is important, and its importance is fully expressed in Lenin’s statement, ‘without revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement.’ But Marxism emphasizes the importance of theory precisely and only because it can guide action. If we have a correct theory but merely prate about it, pigeonhole it and do not put it into practice, then that theory, however good, is of no significance.

The reason generations of freedom fighters have turned to Marxist theory for guidance in their efforts to overthrow colonialism is that Marxists make revolution. Sharp gives his opening four points in the beginning pages of this booklet he writes a short but familiar four point list of steps to a liberation struggle. These four points are,

One must strengthen the oppressed population themselves in their determination, self-confidence and resistance skills,
One must strengthen the independent social groups and institutions of the oppressed people,
One must create a powerful internal resistance force: and
One must develop a wise and grand strategic plan for liberation and implement it skillfully.

Just like his definitions of power and consent Sharp continues to draw directly from Marxist theory (specifically Maoist) in fashioning an organizing structure for nonviolent overthrow. The development of dual power structures or creating shadow governments for the purpose of challenging the hegemony of the state is a well-documented and widespread practice. The basis of resistance in Sharp’s writings is the withdrawal of consent (to be ruled) by the populace, “as the above discussion indicates, liberation from dictatorships ultimately depends on the people ability to liberate themselves.” Taking a look at the writings of Mao Tse Tung brings home some of the evidence of this extensive plagiarism.
In Mao’s essay “Political Mobilization for the War of Resistance” he puts forward four specific points for the political mobilization of the common people. The similarities between Sharp’s main points written between 50 and 60 years after Mao continue to mount especially in light of the fact Sharp’s allegedly original theories begin and end with the political mobilization of the people. Mao writes,

“What does political mobilization mean? First, means telling the army and the people about the political aim of the war. It is necessary for every solider and civilian to see why the war must be fought and how it concerns him … Secondly, it is not merely enough to explaining the aim to them; the steps and policies for its attainment must also be given…there must be a political programme … Thirdly, how should we mobilize them? By word of mouth, by leaflets and bulletins, by newspapers, books and pamphlets, through plays and films, through schools, through mass organizations and through our cadres … Fourthly, to mobilize is not enough … we must link the political mobilization for the war with the developments in the war and with the life of the soldiers and the people, and make it a continuous movement.”

Sharp has taken the heart of this statement - the political mobilization of the population and reconfigured it (without proper recognition) to end before hostilities erupt. His contention that political mobilization coupled with massive civil disobedience will bring oppressive governments to their knees is based on the experience, blood and victories of others who have fought this struggle with guns. The rest of the booklet is a not so subtle rehashing of basic guerilla theory. The idea, “success is most often determined not by negotiating a settlement but through the wise use of the most appropriate and powerful means of resistance available” is a view point shaped by centuries of anti-colonial resistance and active physical opposition to the invasion of lands in Asia, Africa and the America’s by European powers and the formulation of a philosophy to combat that military oppression.

“Political Mobilization is the most fundamental condition for winning the war.”

Examining the history and theories of guerrilla warfare/insurgency is important for correctly perceiving our present political situation and the development of new options of resistance for Xicanos and other Third World people in the United States. Based on an acknowledgement of industrial inferiority the Vietnamese people and leaders approached the development of political will in their war with the French and the United States, as a necessary component of national survival. While the French and U.S. “were fighting to control the national territory … the guerrillas were interested only in winning its population” this is the essential distinction between conventional warfare where “the army fights to occupy territory, roads, strategic heights, vital areas” and guerrilla warfare where “the guerrilla fights to control people, without whose cooperation the land is useless to its possessor” .

In other words, a people’s war produces military power as a consequence of the political mobilization of the people by the army. This is why Vietnamese General Vo Nguyen wrote the main responsibility of a peoples war is first to “educate, mobilize, organize, and arm the whole people in order that they might take part in the resistance” and form a peoples army which according to Mao Tse-Tung Chinese General and theorist of revolutionary war “is not an instrument of the state, but the essence of it, its spirit, its life and its hope.”

It is important to remember that revolutionary situations can, have been and continue to develop in Third World and that these tried and tested methods and theories of revolutionary activity have resulted in numerous revolutionary insurgencies, most of which been successful. The existing body of literature concerning guerrilla movements, insurgencies and revolutionary thought is considerable and much of it focuses on Latin America. It is important to understand that guerilla warfare is the only proven method of successfully challenging the overwhelming military, political and technological strength of the First World. By its nature political warfare is an activity that favors the poor and underdeveloped nations, invigorating the will to resist by creating a will to win. These are not methodologies and ideas produced by inexperienced moaners or whiny children but intelligent people dedicated to the liberation of their nation from colonial domination.

To understand the relationship of this body of knowledge to the Xicano community and what it could ultimately mean for indigenous people to understand the development of physical resistance is a legitimate aspect of Xicano studies. It is constructive topic of academic discussion, debate and dialogue. Why it is not a major branch of study within Xicano Studies, which publicly states its beginning was in the revolutionary Third World student movements of the United States, is a question of concern about the future of Xicano Studies and a subject for future papers.

The theories and ideas of revolutionary methodology should be important pieces in the Xicano struggle against U.S. imperialism. It is important to state up front this is a suggestion that analyzing these different methodologies to organize a Third World population for political change and national liberation is a good idea. Mao was very clear in stating and writing that no two revolutionary situations were the same. All the same, any a mass movement in the U.S. must take race and class into account if success is desired. The same is true of a Xicano Liberation Movement, however, in the end, race and class not withstanding, it is the adherence to and belief in the stated goals of any resistance movement that determines the nature of the combatants and their aspirations.

That being said, it is crucial to note there is currently no basis for making any type of prediction about the goals of a Xicano insurgency, who would fight (since the term Xicano liberation is used frequently we can assume a portion of that populations would participate), where they would come from in society or if their objective would include a geographic succession or some type of autonomous homeland. It is beyond the scope of this post to consider such things. Indeed, it may be beyond the state of current Xicano politics and scholarship to consider these matters. Mainly, because the framework for implementing the type of organizing efforts discussed within the boundaries of the United States has yet to be created. The purpose of this exercise is solely to define and study revolutionary methodologies implemented in other countries for political change and to offer suggestions for creating a method of revolutionary political mobilizations that operates legally within the United States based on those observations.

In the last half the 20th century European imperial and colonial powers around the globe were challenged by Third World liberation movements relying on a strategy of political education escalating into guerilla warfare and then conventional warfare as theorized by Third World military strategist such as Mao Tse-Tung, Che Guevara, Amilcar Cabral and Vo Nuygen Giap . This “fusion of traditional guerrilla tactics with political and, especially, ideological objectives marked the emergence of a revolutionary guerilla warfare or insurgency” during the latter half of the 20th century. This prevailing model of guerilla warfare is traditionally strategized as a rural based military movement where a growing insurgency controls larger and larger tracts of the countryside until the guerillas encircle the cities and cut them off from each other causing the downfall of the central government . This has occurred because up to the present time the majority of any the world’s population lived in rural areas, hence the focus on mobilizing where the people are.

However, dramatic shifts in populations’ centers around the planet are happening and as a result “the world is expected to reach 50 percent urban for the first time in history in 2007. In 2000, 2.9 billion people live in urban areas, comprising 47 percent of the world population. By 2030, 4.9 billion are expected to live in urban areas, or 60 percent of the world.” In addition by 2010 “some 80 percent [of the worlds population] will inhabit the developing world…by 2020 the developing world will have accounted for 90 percent of global population growth since 1930.” This shift to urban settings due to forced migration brought on by war and economic need, along with the ongoing population explosion of Third World peoples is creating new paradigms in the theories of guerilla warfare and insurgencies. These facts along with a clear understanding of how important political education is to beginning guerilla movements and insurgencies is central to Xicanos engaged in cultural and physical resistance to U.S. imperialism as the next logical step in the decolonization of the Americas.

As people indigenous to this continent we languish in the shadow of the greatest military power the world has ever known. By any explanation it appears we are permanent guests in our own land, and are currently moving rapidly toward a permanent illegal alien status. In spite of the rhetoric of revolution embedded in the U.S. Chicano dialogue we continue to deal with the reality of revolution as a phase of youthful fancy. Xicano scholars refuse to have serious conversations among themselves when in fact a large body of scholarly research has been compiled regarding the issues of secession, nation building and revolution. Partly this has happened because as a scholarly community we have not incorporated into Chicano studies a vocabulary appropriate to the subject by which to articulate academically our ideas about revolution.

One goal of this discussion is to define specific revolutionary methodologies that have proven successful over the course of time and relate them to our current situation as Xicano/ Mexicanos in the United States. One important way of doing this is through an understanding of internal colonialism as first a metaphor for understanding the experience and contextualizing the presence of Third World people, specifically non-Europeans, within the U.S. colony “the general concept appears to apply to a number of cases, and is valuable in emphasizing the structural similarities and common historical origins of the positions of Third World peoples inside and outside the United States.”

It is here in the United States that the presence of indigenous people and Africans gives a modern reality to the idea of an internal colony. By placing this discussion of national liberation within a colonial framework it is understood the existence/purpose/history of the continental United States and its territorial holdings are explainable within the framework of the colony . To be specific the colony being is historically an economic venture by Europeans here in the Americas and around the world that by “the middle of the last (19th) century … the colony was understood to mean, both in official circles and in common language, possession of a territory in which European emigrants dominated indigenous peoples.” Accepting this definition of colony allows us to understand how and why the history of the United States is officially told though the lens of the European conqueror. It is by this process of colonial displacement the United States has become a pretend motherland to white Europeans.

It is also important to note this discussion of resistance takes place with full awareness and understanding of the powerful arguments that exist for joining our oppressors. Each urging us to take our place next to the colonizer of our land, and march out to conquer the rest of this world both ideologically, physically, and economically. Indeed, many of us have already proudly chosen that course. Activists during the 1960s recognized this danger when they saw “the potential for the creation of a Chicano/a professional class disassociated from the ethnic Mexican working class in the United States.” As Xicano Historian George Mariscal points out “there was certainly no reason to think that even the most radical Chicano/a could successfully counter the seductive power exerted by consumer society.”

Viewing the success individual Xicanos and Mexicanos have achieved through total compliance we must ask ourselves, what is the point of continued resistance? How will exploring and understanding different methods of resistance help Xicanos make better decisions in strategy and tactics while developing long terms goals for national survival? Fanon was pointed in his depiction of the demise of a nations culture under colonialization,

Colonial domination, because it is total and tends to oversimplify, very soon manages to disrupt in spectacular fashion the cultural life of a conquered people. The cultural obliteration is made possible by the negation of national reality, by new legal relations introduced by the occupying power, by the banishment of the natives and their customs to outlying districts by colonial society, by expropriation, and by the systematic enslaving of men and women. - Frantz Fanon

Xicanos, particularly in academic and activist circles talk all the time about being a colonized people. But we never discuss the physical dismantling of the colonized situation. We talk, debate and speak of our oppression and displacement only in historical, academic, and identity terms never in the context of our colonization being a living and ongoing system of economic exploitation that must be confronted and destroyed. Our subaltern position has become so entrenched in our national and personal psyche we debate and ridicule anyone who argues against total collusion with our subjugators.

Understanding Liberation Movements

The political is paramount as a catalyst for social change. The preceding section outlines the necessity of political education and mobilization through an understanding of internal colonialism and its subsequent political critique by Third World ideology. Conservative, liberal and revolutionary scholars agree this critique of colonialism and internal colonialism around the world has helped to develop the will to resist both Corporatism and U.S. political hegemony. Within this internal colonial critique it is clear that without an understanding of why political change must occur all hard work toward change will fail especially in regards to building armed resistance movements.

After the second World War, Third World ideology in the United States springing from the “Third World Non Aligned Movement” connected, at first ideologically and later militarily “aspiring U.S. revolutionaries to the Third World parties and leaders … who were proving that ‘the power of the people is greater than the man’s technology.” Based on the revolutionary axiom that the political education of the nation is the first order of business for those seeking to bring political change including change through armed resistance Mao Tse-Tung wrote, "without a political goal, guerilla warfare must fail, as it must if its political objectives do not coincide with the aspirations of the people and their sympathy, cooperation and assistance cannot be gained."

For the purposes of this paper definitions of seizing of power (or creating political change) will be limited to the idea there are three ways to SEIZE political power: “Revolution, plot (or coup d’etat), and insurgency.” It is important to understand the differences and overlaps of each category and to note that by definition none of these three categories are inherently progressive and in fact may be just the opposite. Also noteworthy for Chicano scholars engaged in the study of revolutionary movements, particularly armed movements, is the amount of literature written by governments and military leaders on how to suppress guerilla and insurgent movements. This large body of research and publication speaks directly to the seriousness; legitimacy, viability and success of these movements particularly post World War II.

For purposes of academic clarity and discussion within this paper we will define these three concepts in the following way: Revolution: “usually is an explosive upheaval – sudden brief, spontaneous, unplanned (France 1789; China, 1911; Russia, 1917; Hungary, 1956). It is an accident, which can be explained afterward but not predicted other than to note the existence of a revolutionary situation … in a revolution, masses move and then the leaders appear.” Plot: “is the clandestine action of an insurgent group directed at the overthrow of the top leadership in its country. Because of its clandestine nature, a plot cannot and does not involve the masses … it is always a gamble.” Insurgency: “a protracted struggle conducted methodically, step by step, in order to attain specific intermediate objectives leading finally to the overthrow of the existing order … To be sure it can no more be predicted than a revolution ... when an insurgency starts is a difficult legal, political and historical problem … though it cannot be predicted, an insurgency is usually slow to develop and is not an accident, for in an insurgency leaders appear and then the masses are made to move … [a] revolutionary situation did not have to be acute in order for a the insurgency to be initiated.”

Although the words revolution and insurgency are used at times interchangeably and often insurgencies develop into revolutions, it is clear from the definitions that military thinkers do not view them as the same thing. The reminder of this paper will concentrate on definitions and theories of insurgency and later on how those theories could be put into operation through present day Xicano community organizing methodologies.

Guerilla warfare is first and foremost a revolutionary war, a political effort and “whereas in conventional war, either side can initiate the conflict, only one – the insurgent – can initiate a revolutionary war.” Revolutionary wars, particularly since the end of World War II, have succeeded in successfully addressing issues of social and economic inequalities the world over. A purposely misleading and unfortunate reaction by imperialist governments and their the capitalist/corporate structure using multinational corporate media outlets have been to cleverly and successfully misrepresent in modern times most revolutionary wars as simple terrorism or the work of the mentally unbalanced for the purpose of securing their own financial investments in Third World countries and Third World communities within the United States.

These different insurgencies are not solely wars of terror or violence, although those are tactics often used by insurgents and counter insurgents. Nor, are they at first wars to gain control of the land, although that is an end goal of guerilla and insurgent movement. No, the first job of the guerilla is political mobilization. Not in the liberal sense of electoral politics, which in most countries where a revolutionary situation is developing means protecting the status quo by the solidifying of the national bourgeoisie, but in terms of, Raising the level of political consciousness of the people and involving them actively in the revolutionary struggle – is the first task of the guerillas; and it is the nature of this effort, which necessarily takes time, that accounts for the protracted character of the revolutionary war.

Insurgencies begin when a group of people under the control of what they consider to be either a colonial or oppressive government have attempted to resolve their issues (whatever they maybe) with the dominant social group but have either failed to do so or are ignored until the point of rebellion which unfailingly “presupposes the existence of valid popular grievances, sharp social divisions, an unsound or stagnant economy, and oppressive government.” Crucial to the success of any guerilla mobilization is the ability to articulate their political grievances in such a way that will persuade others to accept their version of the outstanding political problem or as it was termed by Mao the “unsolved contradiction” within the current political system. This position leaves little room for accusations of outside interference and political agitation, two of the main allegations made by governments against insurgents engage in political mobilization. If one accepts the notion, “revolutionary propaganda must be essentially true order to be believed,” and that “if it is not believed, people cannot be induced to act on it,” then aligning the insurgency as a political outgrowth of one side of the “unsolved contradiction” becomes a reality. So then,

“If revolution is to be understood as a historical, social process, rather than an accident or a plot, then it will not do to consider guerrillas, terrorist, political assassin as deviants or agents somehow apart from the social fabric, irrelevant or only fortuitously relevant to the historical process. Guerrillas are of the people, or they cannot survive, cannot even come into being. Terrorism, while it aroused the popular will to revolt, is at the same time a manifestation of that will, expressing the first surge of the popular impulse toward a new and different order of existence. It may be argued the terroristic movements attract criminals and psychopaths. So they do. But criminality itself is a form of unconscious social protest, reflecting the distortions of an imperfect society, and in a revolutionary situation the criminal, the psychopath, may become as a good revolutionary as the idealist” (Taber).

Military analysts identify classical modern guerilla warfare mainly by two distinct theoretical paradigms. The first is the Chinese/Vietnamese theories of war developed by Mao Tse-Tung and subsequently expanded on by Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap during the Viet Nam War and the Focoismo theory of guerilla warfare developed in Cuba by Cubans revolutionaries and imported throughout Africa and Latin America by the efforts of Ernesto “Che” Guevara. The organizational differences between the two theories are significant, and although they are both ideologies designed to create revolutionary situations within countries, they approach change in society very differently. An explanation of the two theoretical bodies in terms of their similarities, differences and rules of engagement is central to helping Xicano Third World scholars, organizers and activists currently working in the U.S. today develop a better understanding of the way political change is approached, a fuller appreciation of political glam revolution, and the fetishization of resistance by segments of the Xicano/Latino community here in the United States.

Because of the pervasiveness of revolutionary example during the last half of the 20th century a deeper appreciation for the impact of revolutionary political methodologies on organizing efforts within U.S. Third World communities can be seen and should understood in terms of their contribution to change around the globe. It is important to reiterate that revolutionary war is political war or the furtherance of politics by the means of the gun. Revolutionary political war is by all definitions a protracted or long lasting war. There can be no quick solution to revolutionary or guerilla warfare that is good for the insurgent because “it takes time for a small group of insurgent leaders to organize a revolutionary movement, to raise and develop armed forces, to reach a balance with the opponent, and to overpower him.” (Galula, 10) This sense that time is truly on the side of the insurgent is reiterated by Galula when he writes, “revolutionary war is short only if the counterinsurgency collapses at and early stage, With this central theme in mind we begin to understand “the insurgent has no interest in producing a shock until he feels fully able to withstand the enemy’s expected reaction,” (Galula) this is a situation that could go on for years and in fact until intentions are revealed through “subversion or open violence … an insurgency can reach a high degree of development by legal and peaceful means, at least in countries where political opposition is tolerated,” (Galula).

In order to fully appreciate the emphasis on developing the will of the nation to resist and how this emphasis leads inescapably to a peoples war which is the production of “military power as a consequence of political mobilization.” (Marks) an in depth discussion on the theories of Mao Tse-Tung on guerrilla warfare as a primarily political operation concerned mainly with the mobilization of the Chinese people for what he termed “Total Resistance.” This model of resistance was developed by Mao and his generals because the Chinese were not an industrialized power in control of manufacturing resources with which to create the tools of war to fight first against a Japanese invasion of mainland China during the Sino-Japan War and later while combating the nationalist forces of Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang (Taber).

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Vijay Prashad "The Darker Nations"
Elbaum, Max (2002) What Legacy from the Radical Internationalism of 1968? Radical History Review Issue 82, Winter, p.41
Mao Tse-Tung Primer on Guerilla Methods
Galula, David (1964) “Counter Insurgency Warfare Theory and Practice” Frederick A. Praeger, New York, NY.
Taber, Robert (1965) “The War of the Flea: A study of Guerilla Warfare Theory and Practice” Lyle Stuart New York, NY.
Marks, Thomas A. (2003) “Urban Insurgency” Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 14, No. 3,