After the second World War, Third World ideology in the United States springing from the “Third World Non Aligned Movement” connected, at first ideologically and later militarily “aspiring U.S. revolutionaries to the Third World parties and leaders … who were proving that ‘the power of the people is greater than the man’s technology.” Based on the revolutionary axiom that the political education of the nation is the first order of business for those seeking to bring political change including change through armed resistance Mao Tse-Tung wrote, "without a political goal, guerilla warfare must fail, as it must if its political objectives do not coincide with the aspirations of the people and their sympathy, cooperation and assistance cannot be gained."
For the purposes of this paper definitions of seizing of power (or creating political change) will be limited to the idea there are three ways to SEIZE political power: “Revolution, plot (or coup d’etat), and insurgency.” It is important to understand the differences and overlaps of each category and to note that by definition none of these three categories are inherently progressive and in fact may be just the opposite. Also noteworthy for Chicano scholars engaged in the study of revolutionary movements, particularly armed movements, is the amount of literature written by governments and military leaders on how to suppress guerilla and insurgent movements. This large body of research and publication speaks directly to the seriousness; legitimacy, viability and success of these movements particularly post World War II.
For purposes of academic clarity and discussion within this paper we will define these three concepts in the following way: Revolution: “usually is an explosive upheaval – sudden brief, spontaneous, unplanned (France 1789; China, 1911; Russia, 1917; Hungary, 1956). It is an accident, which can be explained afterward but not predicted other than to note the existence of a revolutionary situation … in a revolution, masses move and then the leaders appear.” Plot: “is the clandestine action of an insurgent group directed at the overthrow of the top leadership in its country. Because of its clandestine nature, a plot cannot and does not involve the masses … it is always a gamble.” Insurgency: “a protracted struggle conducted methodically, step by step, in order to attain specific intermediate objectives leading finally to the overthrow of the existing order … To be sure it can no more be predicted than a revolution ... when an insurgency starts is a difficult legal, political and historical problem … though it cannot be predicted, an insurgency is usually slow to develop and is not an accident, for in an insurgency leaders appear and then the masses are made to move … [a] revolutionary situation did not have to be acute in order for a the insurgency to be initiated.”
Although the words revolution and insurgency are used at times interchangeably and often insurgencies develop into revolutions, it is clear from the definitions that military thinkers do not view them as the same thing. The reminder of this paper will concentrate on definitions and theories of insurgency and later on how those theories could be put into operation through present day Xicano community organizing methodologies.
Guerilla warfare is first and foremost a revolutionary war, a political effort and “whereas in conventional war, either side can initiate the conflict, only one – the insurgent – can initiate a revolutionary war.” Revolutionary wars, particularly since the end of World War II, have succeeded in successfully addressing issues of social and economic inequalities the world over. A purposely misleading and unfortunate reaction by imperialist governments and their the capitalist/corporate structure using multinational corporate media outlets have been to cleverly and successfully misrepresent in modern times most revolutionary wars as simple terrorism or the work of the mentally unbalanced for the purpose of securing their own financial investments in Third World countries and Third World communities within the United States.
These different insurgencies are not solely wars of terror or violence, although those are tactics often used by insurgents and counter insurgents. Nor, are they at first wars to gain control of the land, although that is an end goal of guerilla and insurgent movement. No, the first job of the guerilla is political mobilization. Not in the liberal sense of electoral politics, which in most countries where a revolutionary situation is developing means protecting the status quo by the solidifying of the national bourgeoisie, but in terms of, Raising the level of political consciousness of the people and involving them actively in the revolutionary struggle – is the first task of the guerillas; and it is the nature of this effort, which necessarily takes time, that accounts for the protracted character of the revolutionary war.
Insurgencies begin when a group of people under the control of what they consider to be either a colonial or oppressive government have attempted to resolve their issues (whatever they maybe) with the dominant social group but have either failed to do so or are ignored until the point of rebellion which unfailingly “presupposes the existence of valid popular grievances, sharp social divisions, an unsound or stagnant economy, and oppressive government.” Crucial to the success of any guerilla mobilization is the ability to articulate their political grievances in such a way that will persuade others to accept their version of the outstanding political problem or as it was termed by Mao the “unsolved contradiction” within the current political system. This position leaves little room for accusations of outside interference and political agitation, two of the main allegations made by governments against insurgents engage in political mobilization. If one accepts the notion, “revolutionary propaganda must be essentially true order to be believed,” and that “if it is not believed, people cannot be induced to act on it,” then aligning the insurgency as a political outgrowth of one side of the “unsolved contradiction” becomes a reality. So then,
“If revolution is to be understood as a historical, social process, rather than an accident or a plot, then it will not do to consider guerrillas, terrorist, political assassin as deviants or agents somehow apart from the social fabric, irrelevant or only fortuitously relevant to the historical process. Guerrillas are of the people, or they cannot survive, cannot even come into being. Terrorism, while it aroused the popular will to revolt, is at the same time a manifestation of that will, expressing the first surge of the popular impulse toward a new and different order of existence. It may be argued the terroristic movements attract criminals and psychopaths. So they do. But criminality itself is a form of unconscious social protest, reflecting the distortions of an imperfect society, and in a revolutionary situation the criminal, the psychopath, may become as a good revolutionary as the idealist” (Taber).
Military analysts identify classical modern guerilla warfare mainly by two distinct theoretical paradigms. The first is the Chinese/Vietnamese theories of war developed by Mao Tse-Tung and subsequently expanded on by Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap during the Viet Nam War and the Focoismo theory of guerilla warfare developed in Cuba by Cubans revolutionaries and imported throughout Africa and Latin America by the efforts of Ernesto “Che” Guevara. The organizational differences between the two theories are significant, and although they are both ideologies designed to create revolutionary situations within countries, they approach change in society very differently. An explanation of the two theoretical bodies in terms of their similarities, differences and rules of engagement is central to helping Xicano Third World scholars, organizers and activists currently working in the U.S. today develop a better understanding of the way political change is approached, a fuller appreciation of political glam revolution, and the fetishization of resistance by segments of the Xicano/Latino community here in the United States.
Because of the pervasiveness of revolutionary example during the last half of the 20th century a deeper appreciation for the impact of revolutionary political methodologies on organizing efforts within U.S. Third World communities can be seen and should understood in terms of their contribution to change around the globe. It is important to reiterate that revolutionary war is political war or the furtherance of politics by the means of the gun. Revolutionary political war is by all definitions a protracted or long lasting war. There can be no quick solution to revolutionary or guerilla warfare that is good for the insurgent because “it takes time for a small group of insurgent leaders to organize a revolutionary movement, to raise and develop armed forces, to reach a balance with the opponent, and to overpower him.” (Galula, 10) This sense that time is truly on the side of the insurgent is reiterated by Galula when he writes, “revolutionary war is short only if the counterinsurgency collapses at and early stage, With this central theme in mind we begin to understand “the insurgent has no interest in producing a shock until he feels fully able to withstand the enemy’s expected reaction,” (Galula) this is a situation that could go on for years and in fact until intentions are revealed through “subversion or open violence … an insurgency can reach a high degree of development by legal and peaceful means, at least in countries where political opposition is tolerated,” (Galula).
In order to fully appreciate the emphasis on developing the will of the nation to resist and how this emphasis leads inescapably to a peoples war which is the production of “military power as a consequence of political mobilization.” (Marks) an in depth discussion on the theories of Mao Tse-Tung on guerrilla warfare as a primarily political operation concerned mainly with the mobilization of the Chinese people for what he termed “Total Resistance.” This model of resistance was developed by Mao and his generals because the Chinese were not an industrialized power in control of manufacturing resources with which to create the tools of war to fight first against a Japanese invasion of mainland China during the Sino-Japan War and later while combating the nationalist forces of Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang (Taber).
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Vijay Prashad "The Darker Nations"
Elbaum, Max (2002) What Legacy from the Radical Internationalism of 1968? Radical History Review Issue 82, Winter, p.41
Mao Tse-Tung Primer on Guerilla Methods
Galula, David (1964) “Counter Insurgency Warfare Theory and Practice” Frederick A. Praeger, New York, NY.
Taber, Robert (1965) “The War of the Flea: A study of Guerilla Warfare Theory and Practice” Lyle Stuart New York, NY.
Marks, Thomas A. (2003) “Urban Insurgency” Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 14, No. 3,
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